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NOTES
Direct Payment Housing Subsidies Count as Household Income in
Determining Food Stamp Benefits: The Effect of Ruhe v. Bergland
I

INTRODUCTION

The federal food stamp program first began in 1939 as a plan to distribute surplus food to needy families.1 In 1964, Congress enacted a revised food stamp program which expanded the scope of the program
beyond allocation of surplus food.2 The Food Stamp Act of 19641 (the
1964 Act) embodied a federal plan to contribute money to needy families

in order to increase the families' food purchasing power.' After determining that the 1964 Act needed drastic reform,5 Congress enacted a

new food stamp program in 1977. 6 Congress intended the Food Stamp

Act of 19777 (the 1977 Act) to eliminate undeserving recipients from the
food stamp program.'
1. S. REP. No. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3276-77; AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTTUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FOOD STAMP REFORM 3
(1977) (hereinafter referred to as INSTrrUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY).
2. See Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2018 (1982)); INsTrrUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 1, at 3-4. Under the Food
Stamp Act of 1964, certified recipient families exchanged normal food expenditures for food coupons
of a higher monetary value. Id. In 1964, recipient families received approximately ten dollars in
food stamp coupons for each six dollars of normal food expenditures. The four dollars difference
represented a federal contribution to the food stamp program. Id
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 (1982).
4. See id. §§ 2011-2018 (1982). By contributing four dollars to every six dollars spent on
foodstuffs, the federal government increased the food purchasing power of participating families by
67%. See id
5. See H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. News 1978-79. The House Committee on Agriculture determined that the 1964 Food Stamp
Act was too complex and difficult to administer and, therefore, was economically inefficient. Ia at
1978. In addition, the House committee determined that fraud and abuse of program benefits was
too prevalent under the 1964 Act. Id at 1979.
6. Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982). Congress amended the Food Stamp Act
of 1964 numerous times, most importantly in 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976. INsTrrutrE FOR PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 1, at 4. Congress incorporated many of the amendments to the 1964 Act into the
Food Stamp Act of 1977. H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1978.
7. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. News 1980-81. In enacting the 1977 Act, Congress intended to eliminate 1.3 million people
from the food stamp program and to reduce the food stamp benefits of another 317 million people.
d at 1980. The House committee stated that the 1977 Act would eliminate the non-needy from the
food stamp program by excluding high gross income families, students, aliens, and families with
considerable assets from food stamp benefits. Id. at 1980-81.
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In an effort to eliminate undeserving recipients from the food stamp
program, Congress included a provision within the 1977 Act which carefully defined the prerequisites for participation in the food stamp program.9 Section 5(a) of the 1977 Act provides that a household's income
and financial resources shall determine eligibility and the degree of participation in the food stamp program. 10 Section 5(d) of the 1977 Act
defines household income as all income from any source, except for
twelve exceptions listed in section 5(d)(1)-(12)." Section 5(d)(1) of the
1977 Act12 excludes from household income any gain or benefit which is
not in the form of money directly payable to a household.13 Thus, section 5(d)(1) distinguishes between vendor payments 14 and direct payments. 5 Vendor payments which bypass the actual recipient and flow
directly to the recipient's creditor or landlord, 6 do not count as household income for food stamp allocation purposes. 1 7 However, direct payments flow directly to the actual recipient and are counted as household
income, unless specifically exempted."i
9. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1981). Section 5(a) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 provides that only
those households whose incomes and other financial resources limit their ability to obtain a more
nutritious diet are eligible for food stamp benefits. Id. § 2014(a).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 2014(d). The House Committee on Agriculture decided that, as a general rule, all
income from whatever source derived should determine a household's level of food stamp benefits.
H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2001. The committee intended to define household income in the broadest possible manner. Id.
Exceptions to the general rule include money payable to third parties on behalf of recipients, loans,
reimbursement payments, income earned by minors, irregular income, lump sum payments, and
money received for the benefit of nonhousehold members. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(1-12) (1982).
12. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(1) (1982).
13. Id.
14. See id Vendor payments are monetary benefits paid directly to a billing party on behalf of
and in satisfaction of an existing debt owed by a benefit recipient. H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2005.
15. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(1) (1982). Direct payments are monetary benefits paid directly to a
benefit recipient and earmarked for expenditure in a specified area. H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1998-99. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2014(d)(1) (1982). Section (d) specifically exempts vendor payments from household income accounting, but, by inference, includes all direct payments unless otherwise specifically excluded in
sections 5(d)(1-12). Id
16. See supranote 14. Vendor payment recipients cannot allocate housing subsidy payments to
improper areas because vendor payments bypass the actual benefit recipients. Id.
17. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(1) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2005; see Dean v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Hawaii
1977) (payments to landlords on behalf of welfare recipients do not count as income); Anderson v.
Butz, 428 F. Supp. 245, 253 (E.D. Cal. 1975), affld, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977) (use of housing
subsidy vendor payments in determining household income for food stamp purposes violates congressional intent). But see Compton v. Tennessee Dep't of Public Welfare, 532 F.2d 561, 563 (6th
Cir. 1976) (vendor-payment housing subsidies are readily ascertainable economic benefits and count
as household income in determining food stamp benefit levels). See generally H.R. REP. No. 464,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2008. Vendor payments
are usually medical payments or housing payments. Id. Neither medical nor housing payments
count as household income. Id.
18. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-28, reprinted in
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II. THE CASE
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
In Ruhe
whether a Department of Agriculture regulation2" which contains language almost identical to section 5(d) of the 1977 Act2" properly followed from the enabling legislation. 2 Section 4(c) of the 1977 Act23
authorized the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to promulgate regulations to administer the food stamp program and to effectuate the congressional intent embodied in the program.24 Pursuant to this
authorization, the USDA issued regulations tracking the direct-payment
income inclusion provision of section 5(d)(1) of the 1977 Act. 5 In
Ruhe,26 the plaintiffs, Mildred S. Ruhe, Hester Hembry, and Irene
O'Brien, challenged the USDA's tracking regulations as being inconsistent with the 1977 Act27 and in violation of the due process 28 and equal
protection29 clauses of the United States Constitution.
v. Bergland,"9 the

In Ruhe, the plaintiffs were residents of Arlington County, Virginia
and received direct-payment housing subsidies from the county's rent
31
assistance program. 3 ° In addition, they received federal food stamps.
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2002-05. Direct payments include annuity payments, pension
payments, retirement and disability benefits, veterans' benefits, workmens' compensation, unemployment compensation, old age and survivors' benefits, strike benefits, and general welfare assistance
payments. Id.
19. 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982).
20. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1) (1984).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d) (1982). Compare id. (any gain or benefit not in the form of money
payable directly to a household is excluded from food stamp income accounting) with 7 C.F.R.

§ 273.9(c)(1) (1984) (any gain or benefit which is not in the form of money payable directly to a
household is excluded from food stamp income accounting).
22. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982).
24. It.; see supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (congressional desire to exclude undeserving

recipients from program).
25. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(1) (1982); 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(l)(i)-(ii) (1984). The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued two regulations that contain language closely resembling
section 5(d)(1) of the 1977 Act. See supra note 21 (comparing USDA regulations with 1977 Food
Stamp Act).
26. 683 F.2d at 105. In Ruhe, the plaintiffs argued that the USDA regulations discriminate
against recipients of direct-payment housing subsidies. Id.
27. Ide at 103. In Ruhe, the plaintiffs argued that the USDA regulations which include vendorpayment housing subsidies as household income are inconsistent with the purpose of the 1977 Act
embodied in the Act's declaration of policy, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982), and with the intent of Congress
embodied in the legislative history. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-05.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in
part that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Id
29. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides in part that no state shall deprive any person of equal protection of the laws. Id
30. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103. In Ruhe, the plaintiffs received direct-payment housing subsidies
under the Arlington County Expense Relief Program for Needy Persons. ARLINGTON COUNTY,
VA. CODE §§ 44-1 to -4 (1974).
31. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103. Plaintiff Ruhe received $80.89 per month from the Arlington
County Program and $35.00 per month in food stamps. Ruhe v. Block, 507 F. Supp. 1290, 1293-94
(E.D. Va. 1981), affd sub nom. Ruhe v. Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff Hembry
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Relying upon its regulations, 2 the USDA considered the plaintiffs' housing subsidies to be household income and decreased each plaintiff's food
stamp benefits.3" The plaintiffs sued the USDA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 4 seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.3" In granting the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment,3 6 the district court concluded that the USDA regulations were not
inconsistent with the 1977 Act 7 and were not violative of the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.3 8 The district court reasoned that since the challenged regulations contained the same language as section 5(d)(1) of the
1977 Act, the regulations were consistent with the 1977 Act. 9 The district court further determined that a reasonable basis' existed for the
direct-payment income inclusion plan.4 1 Therefore, the distinction in the
received $95.73 per month from the Arlington County Program and $20.00 per month in food
stamps. Id. Plaintiff O'Brien received $88.93 per month from the Arlington County Program and
$42.00 per month in food stamps. Id.
32. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (1984).
33. Ruhe v. Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1293-94. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Ruhe v. Bergland, 683
F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982); Joint Appendix for Appellant at 48, Ruhe v. Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th
Cir. 1982) (affidavit of Mildred S. Ruhe); id. at 49 (affidavit of Hester Hembry); id. at 52 (affidavit of
Irene O'Brien). The addition of the Arlington County money raised the plaintiffs' aggregate income
and lowered plaintiffs' aggregate food stamp benefits. See Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1293-94; Brief for
Appellee, supra, at 6. Plaintiff Ruhe sustained a drop in food stamp benefits of between $13.00 and
$15.00 per month due to the USDA's regulatory income inclusion provisions. Block, 507 F. Supp. at
1293. Plaintiff Hembry sustained a drop of $14.00 per month in food stamp benefits. Id.
34. Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1290. The plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of themselves
and other recipients of Arlington County housing subsidy payments. Id. at 1294. The district court
determined that the interests of the named plaintiffs were broad enough to protect the interests of the
unnamed plaintiffs and refused to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 1295; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
35. Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1291. The plaintiffs sought to have the district court declare the
direct-income inclusion provisions contained in section 5(d) of the 1977 Act unconstitutional and
sought an injunction to prevent the USDA from including the Arlington County subsidy payments
in household income for food stamp allocation purposes. Id.
36. Id. at 1299.
37. Id. at 1298; see infra text accompanying note 39.
38. Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1299; see infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
39. Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1295-96; see supra note 21 (language of USDA regulations is similar
to language in the 1977 Act).
40. See Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1298. The district court determined that the proper test by
which to evaluate the constitutionality of a welfare classification is the "reasonable basis" test contained in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1298. In Dandridge, the Supreme Court held that a social welfare classification does not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if the classification serves a rational purpose in fulfilling a legitimate government objective. Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485. Thus, a social welfare statute
can discriminate if the statute possesses a reasonable basis in fulfilling a legitimate government objective. Id. Moreover, the district court in Block found support for the reasonable basis test in the
Supreme Court's language in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961). Block, 507 F. Supp.
at 1298. In McGowan, the Supreme Court held that a statutory discrimination is not unconstitutional if any state of facts reasonably exists to justify the discriminatory classification. McGowan,
366 U.S. at 425-26.
41. See Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1298. The district court found that Congress included the vendor-payment inclusion provision in the 1977 Act because all money coming into a household which
could be spent on food should constitute income for purposes of food stamp allocations. Id. The
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regulation between vendor payments and direct payments did not violate
the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.42
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 43 the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in interpreting the 1977 Act" and that
the legislative history accompanying the 1980 amendments4 5 to the 1977
Act clearly showed that Congress did not intend to distinguish between
vendor payments and direct payments.46 In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the regulatory distinction between vendor payments and direct
payments for food stamp allocation purposes unconstitutionally discriminated against recipients of direct-payment subsidies.4 7
In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the USDA regulations were
inconsistent with the 1977 Act,4" the court of appeals found that the
1977 Act specifically authorized the direct-payment and vendor-payment
distinction as well as the USDA's household income inclusion regulations. 49 Concurring with the district court's decision,50 the court of appeals held that the similarity between the language in the 1977 Act and
the language in the USDA regulation was probative evidence that the
regulation was consistent with the Act.51 The Ruhe court stated that
Congress had implicitly approved of the USDA's statutory construction
of the 1977 Act by not seeking to alter the regulation after the USDA
district court held that this determination by the House committee was a reasonable basis for the
1977 Act's provisions. Id.
42. Id. at 1299; see supra notes 29, 40-41.
43. See Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103. The plaintiffs appealed from the district court's order for summary judgment in favor of the defendants on February 27, 1981. Brief for Appellee at 7, Ruhe v.
Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982).
44. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103-04. The plaintiffs argued that the court of appeals should not read
section 5(d) of the 1977 Act alone, but instead should consider the provision in the context of the
entire food stamp program. Id at 103. The plaintiffs suggested that the court of appeals should
consider Congress' official declaration of policy in enacting the 1977 Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011, together
with any appropriate legislative history in deciding whether the USDA regulations are consistent
with the 1977 Act- Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103.
45. Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-249, 94 Stat. 357 (1980) (codified at
7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982)).
46. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104; see H.R. REP. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 957-58. In the House report, the Agriculture Committee
specifically mentioned the Arlington County plan and suggested that direct-payment housing subsidies deserve the same income exclusion status as vendor-payment housing subsidies.
47. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105. The plaintiffs argued that the USDA regulations unreasonably
discriminate against recipients of Arlington County direct-payment housing subsidies by treating
other recipients of direct-payment housing subsidies more favorably. Id. The plaintiffs noted that
recipients of federal direct-payment housing subsidies in Green Bay, Wisconsin and South Bend,
Indiana did not have their housing subsidies included as household income. Block, 507 F. Supp. at
1298-99. Brief for Appellee at 26, Rube v. Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982).
48. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06.
49. Id. at 103; see infra text accompanying notes 50-51, 53-55.
50. See Block, 507 F. Supp. at 1295-96.
51. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103-04; see supranote 21 (the language of USDA regulations is similar to
the language in 1977 Act).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1984], Art. 7

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
promulgated and published the regulation. 2 Further, the court of appeals found that the USDA brought its construction of the 1977 Act to
the attention of the public and Congress.5 3 The Ruhe court determined
that Congress would have shown any dissatisfaction with the USDA regulation by amending the regulation's enabling statute.5 4 The court of
appeals noted that the 1980 amendments to the 1977 Act did not alter
section 5(d)(1) of the 1977 Act. Therefore, the court of appeals held that
the USDA had discerned the congressional intent.5
In addition, the court of appeals held that since the USDA had correctly discerned congressional intent, the plaintiffs' use of legislative history as evidence5 6 was not controlling on the question of the propriety of
the direct-payment income inclusion provision.5 7 The plaintiffs introduced two items of legislative history to suggest that Congress did not
intend to distinguish between vendor payments and direct payments for
food stamp allocation purposes. 8 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued
that the House Agriculture Committee's Report which accompanied the
1977 Act indicated that Congress did not intend for housing subsidies to
be considered as household income.5 9 However, the Ruhe court disregarded the 1977 House report and held that legislative history should not
control on statutory construction questions when the statutory language

itself is clear.'
52. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-05.
53. Id. at 105.
54. Id. The Ruhe court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 487-89 (1940), and held that the USDA construed the 1977 Act correctly. Ruhe, 683
F.2d at 104. In Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court held that when Congress does not seek to alter an
agency's regulation after the agency has construed a federal statute, courts should presume that the
agency has discerned congressional intent correctly. Apex Hosiery Co., 310 U.S. at 489.
55. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105; see id at 104 n.3; see also supranotes 8 & 54 and accompanying text
(congressional intent in 1977 Food Stamp Act).
56. See infra note 58 (explaining plaintiffs' legislative history evidence).
57. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-05.
58. Id. The plaintiffs introduced two reports, issued by the House Committee on Agriculture in
1977 and 1980, which tended to show that some members of the House committee disagreed with
direct-payment income inclusion. Id. at 104. One report suggests that housing subsidies generally
should not constitute household income for food stamp purposes. H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2008-09.
59. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104; see H.R. REP. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprintedin 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2009; see supra note 58 (congressional intent behind housing subsidy payment income inclusion).
60. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on two Supreme Court
opinions in holding that legislative histories and other extrinsic evidence pertaining to the 1977 Act
were irrelevant: United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979) (courts should imply
exceptions to clearly delineated statutes only when such action is essential to prevent absurd results
or consequences which vary with the policy of the enactment as a whole); United States v. Lexington
Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914) (if a statute's plain and unambiguous language contains the legislative purpose, courts have a duty to give the statute effect according to its terms). The
court of appeals in Ruhe found that the 1977 Act's plain and unambiguous language contained the
legislative purpose and determined that reliance upon this language would not create absurd or
unreasonable results. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
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In addition to the 1977 legislative history, the plaintiffs argued that the
House Agriculture Committee's Report concerning the 1980 amendments to the 1977 Act6 1 demonstrated that Congress did not intend to
distinguish direct payments from vendor payments. a2 The plaintiffs identified specific language in the committee's report which suggested that
the USDA should revise its regulations to abolish the inequity of the
vendor-payment and direct-payment distinction.6 3 The court of appeals
disregarded the 1980 House report" on the ground that while the opin-

ions of a later Congress should receive substantial deference, the intent of
the earlier enacting Congress, as contained in the plain meaning of the
statute in question, should control.6 5 The Ruhe court found additional
support for disregarding the 1980 House report. In a letter written by

Congressman Thomas S. Foley, Chairman of the House Agriculture
Committee, to Congressman Joseph L. Fisher of Arlington County,
Chairman Foley stated that any change in the direct-payment income

inclusion provision would require legislative action.66

Finally, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
USDA regulations violated the equal protection guarantees of the United
States Constitution.67 The Ruhe court noted that since the USDA regulations and the 1977 Act contained almost identical language, an attack
on the constitutionality of the regulation was also an attack on the enabling statute.6" The court of appeals held that the statutory distinction
between vendor payments and direct payments was not unconstitutional
merely because the distinction resulted in an inequitable allocation of
food stamps to the plaintiffs.6 9 The Ruhe court relied on the Supreme
61. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104; see H.R. REP. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-45, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 957-58.
62. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
63. Id The 1980 House report mentions that income exclusion status for food stamp allocation
purposes should extend to both vendor-payment and direct-payment housing subsidies. H.R. REP.
No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 957-58.
The 1980 House report also makes direct reference to the Arlington County plan and recommends
extension of income exclusion status to subsidies under the plan. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
64. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105.
65. Iad; see United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) (subsequent legislative history irrelevant when intent of enacting Congress is clear); Moore v. Harris, 623 F.2d 908, 921-22
(4th Cir. 1980) (intent of earlier Congress which enacted statute controls).
66. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105; see Letter from House Agriculture Committee Chairman, Thomas
S. Foley, to Congressman Joseph L. Fisher (September 7, 1979), reprinted in Joint Appendix for
Appellant at 71, Ruhe v. Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982).
67. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105; see infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
68. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105; see supratext accompanying note 21 (USDA regulation identical to
1977 Act).
69. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105. The court of appeals held that the direct-payment income inclusion
provisions contained in the 1977 Act did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights because a
reasonable basis existed for the statute. Ia; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1969)
(statutory classification that creates inequality in benefit allotments does not violate equal protection
clause if classification possesses reasonable basis); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
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Court's decision in Dandridgev. Williams7 0 to conclude that a statutory
classification that creates inequality in benefit allotments does not violate
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution if a "reasonable basis" exists for the classification."1 The court of appeals found that
the reasonable basis test was the appropriate mechanism for determining
the constitutionality of the direct-income inclusion provision. 72 The
court of appeals applied the Dandridge reasonable basis test to the facts
in Ruhe and determined that the inherent lack of government control
over the expenditure of direct-payment housing subsidies as compared
with the government control over vendor-payment housing subsidies
provided a reasonable basis for distinguishing between the two pro-

grams.7 3 Since the 1977 Act's direct-payment inclusion provision possessed a reasonable basis, the court of appeals concluded that the 1977
Act did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.74

111

ANALYSIS

In affirming the decision of the district court, 75 the Ruhe court relied
on the "plain meaning rule" of statutory construction. 6 The plain
61, 78 (1911) (classification having some reasonable basis does not offend equal protection clause
merely because in practice classification results in some inequality). Courts generally will not consider a statutory classification unconstitutional if the classification serves a legitimate governmental
function and is not arbitrary or capricious in application. M. FORxOSCH, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW
520 (2d ed. 1969). Few classifications are per se unconstitutional. See id. For example, the Supreme
Court, in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908), held that sex could serve as a basis for
statutory classification in determining maximum allowable working hours. However, in Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 532 (1923), the Supreme Court held that sex could not serve as a
basis for statutory classification in determining allowable working wages. In evaluating whether a
statutory classification is unconstitutional, courts routinely consider the practical application of the
classification as well as the nature of the classification itself. FoRKOSCH, supra, at 519-21.
70. 397 U.S. 471 (1969).
71. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06; see Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (a welfare classification which
fulfills a legitimate governmental objective and is not arbitrary and capricious does not violate equal
protection); see supra note 40 (explaining Dandridge reasonable basis test); see also supra note 69
(illustrating application of reasonable basis test).
72. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105. The court of appeals determined that the Dandridgetest was appropriate because Dandridgedealt specifically with a welfare classification that faced an equal protection
clause challenge. Id.; see Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485 (reasonable basis test).
73. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971) (a statute is not
unconstitutional if statutory goals are legitimate and classification is rationally related to achievement of those goals); Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485 (classifications that have reasonable bases do not
offend the Constitution). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERcAN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW 991-1102
(1978); Tussman & Tenbroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 348-51
(1949); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-32
(1972).
74. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 104. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited prior Supreme Court opinions in
support of its use of the plain meaning rule. See supra note 60; see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
184 n.29 (1978) (courts need not refer to legislative history when statutory language is clear); Luria
Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 1982) (if statutory language is plain, judicial inquiry
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meaning rule provides that if a statute's plain and unambiguous language
gives a clear indication of the legislative purpose behind the statute's enactment, courts must construe the statute with deference only toward the
express terms in the statute." In effect, the plain meaning rule renders a
statute's legislative history irrelevant in statutory construction when congressional intent is clearly manifest in the words of the statute.78 In relying upon the plain meaning rule, the court of appeals refused to allow the
plaintiffs' legislative history evidence to control. 79 The Ruhe court construed the 1977 Act only with regard to the statute's plain and unambiguous language. s0 Although judicial support for the plain meaning rule
has wavered over the years,"1 today most federal circuit courts accept the
rule and avoid8 2reliance upon legislative history when the statutory lan-

guage is clear.
Although the plain meaning rule is appropriate in statutory construction when a statute is unambiguous on its face, 3 courts routinely give a
statute a conservative or liberal construction when the statute's subject
matter so demands.8 4 Generally, courts strictly construe statutes which

is at end); Director, Office Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Bethlehem
Mines Corp., 669 F.2d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 1982) (language of statute governs statutory construction).
But see Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (ascertainment of
meaning apparent on face of single statute need not end inquiry); Boston Sand Co. v. United States,
278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the plain meaning rule is axiom of experience and
not a rule of law and does not preclude the consideration of persuasive evidence if such evidence
exists); Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affidsub nona. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S.
404 (1945) (sympathetic and imaginative discovery, not literal interpretation, is the surest guide to
statutory construction). See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die The "PlainMeaningRule"
and Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975).
77. See United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (when words in a statute
are clear, courts must treat the express language in the statute as a final expression of the legislature's
intent); Murphy, supra note 76, at 1299.
78. See, eg., VA, 437 U.S. at 184 (inspection of legislative history unnecessary when statute is
plain and unambiguous); Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1226 (4th Cir. 1981) (legislative history should not control in statutory construction unless statute is ambiguous).
79. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-06. In Ruhe, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' evidence of
1977 legislative history because the 1977 Act was plain and unambiguous on its face and did not
need clarification. IdJ at 104; see infra text accompanying notes 93-96. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' evidence of 1980 legislative history because such evidence was not
helpful in discerning prior congressional intent. Id. at 105; see infra text accompanying notes 10409.
80. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
81. Compare TVA, 437 U.S. at 184 n.29 (courts need not refer to legislative history when statutory language is clear) with United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)
(legislative history is never incompetent or irrelevant evidence) and Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (courts must consider words free from doubt in statutes as final expression of
legislative intent). See generally Murphy, supra note 76, at 1300-03.
82. See supra note 76 (applications of plain meaning rule); see generally Murphy, supra note 76,
at 1308.
83. ExparteCollett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949); see supranote 76 (explanation and analysis of plain
meaning rule).
84. See, eg., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (liberal construction given to
safety legislation); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1979) (strict construction in favor of
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stand in derogation of either the common law or human rights.8 5 How6
ever, most courts give public welfare statutes a liberal construction.
By recognizing the public welfare interests of the 1977 Act and construing the Act liberally, 7 the Ruhe court could have determined that
Congress did not intend for direct-payment housing subsidies to be included as household income. 88 However, a court cannot construe a statute beyond the limits of congressional intent. 89 Regardless of any
preference that a court might have toward construing a statute in derogation of the common law strictly or toward construing a public welfare
statute liberally, courts must give overriding deference to the statute's
clear and unambiguous meaning.9 0 Therefore, the plain meaning rule
takes precedence over other statutory construction devices. 9 ' In Ruhe,
lenity to defendant given to penal statutes); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R.R., 247 U.S. 310,
313 (1918) (strict construction is given to statutes in derogation of principles of equity); Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1910) (strict construction given to statutes in derogation of common law); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 564, 19 So. 2d 234,239 (1944)
(liberal construction is given to statutes affecting the general welfare of a state); Blue v. Beach, 155
Ind. 121, 130, 56 N.E. 89, 92-93 (1900) (liberal construction given to statutes necessary for protection of health); Dunbar v. Spratt-Snyder Co., 208 Iowa 490, 492, 226 N.W. 22, 22-23 (1929) (liberal
construction is given to statutes possessing humanitarian or beneficial attributes); City of St. Louis v.
Carpenter, 341 S.W. 2d 786, 788 (Mo. 1961) (liberal construction is given to statutes enacted for the
advancement of public welfare).
85. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. R.P. Andrews Paper Co., 256 U.S. 582, 587 (1921) (statutes in derogation of human rights receive strict construction); Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242
U.S. 238, 251-52 (1916) (statutes in derogation of common rights receive strict construction); State
ex rel Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 257, 48 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1932) (strict construction is given to
statutes in derogation of common rights); Zeig v. Zeig, 65 Nev. 464, 486, 198 P.2d 724, 734 (1948)
(strict construction given to statutes in derogation of common law).
86. See, eg., Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817, 818-19 (E.D. Ky. 1944)
(public welfare statutes receive very liberal construction); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great Southern
Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 266, 239 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1951) (statutes benefitting public welfare
receive liberal construction). See generally 3 C.D. SANDs, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.01 (4th ed. 1973) (courts liberally construe welfare statutes).
87. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982). Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act to promote the general
welfare and safeguard the health and well-being of the nation's households by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households. Id.
88. See H.R. RIP. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 957-58. In Ruhe, the court of appeals could have relied on the language in that House
report which suggested that direct payments should receive the same income exclusion status as
vendor payments. If the Ruhe court had relied on the House report, the court could have liberally
construed section 5(d) of the 1977 Act in favor of the plaintiffs. See id; 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982). But
see infra text accompanying notes 89-91 (explaining why the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could
not rely on the House report or liberally construe section 5(d) in favor of the plaintiffs).
89. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (courts must interpret statutes
within the narrow limits of congressional intent); United States v. Rosenblum Trucklines, 315 U.S..
50, 55 (1942) (legislative will is a controlling factor in statutory construction).
90. See supra notes 60, 65 & 76 (explaining plain meaning rule); see also supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (on controlling weight that plain meaning of statute possesses over legislative history). See generally Murphy, supra note 76, at 1299; Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic
Aids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 6 (1939).
91. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979) (plain meaning rule); see also
supra notes 60, 65 & 76 (explaining plain meaning rule); see supra text accompanying notes 77-78
(explaining controlling weight of plain meaning rule). See generally Jones, supra note 90, at 5-7.
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the court of appeals refused to liberally construe the 1977 Act beyond the
Act's plain and uriambiguous language.9 2 Since Congress' intent was
clear from the language of the Act, 93 the Ruhe court did not have the
option of liberally construing the 1977 Act.94
In addition, the court of appeals correctly refused to consider the 1977
House Agriculture Committee's Report as controlling on the issue of
congressional intent.9 5 The Ruhe court's determination that the 1977
Act was unambiguous on its face rendered any consideration of the Act's
legislative history impermissible. 96 While most federal circuit courts

would agree with the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the 1977 Act's legislative history, 97 a few circuit courts have held that legislative history is
probative evidence even when the statute in question contains plain and
unambiguous language.9 8 Even the United States Supreme Court has
wavered on the amount of deference that the plain meaning rule deserves. 99 In Caminetti v. United States,"° the Supreme Court stated that

when the language of a statute is plain, no duty of statutory construction
arises and courts should look only toward the language of the statute in
determining congressional intent.1" 1 However, in Harrison v. Northern
Trust Co.,1 °2 the Supreme Court modified the Caminetti rule by suggesting that no rule forbids the use of legislative
history, regardless of
10 3
how clear a statute's words may appear.
92. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
93. 1d; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-54 (intent of Congress in the 1977 Act).
94. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104; see supra notes 81 & 89 (explaining the court's duty in statutory
construction when the statute is clear and unambiguous); see also supra text accompanying notes 4954, 60, 89-90 (Ruhe court's obligation under plain meaning rule to disregard legislative history and
liberal construction of statute).
95. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104.
96. Id See generally Jones, supra note 90, at 6-10.
97. See, eg., Collett, 337 U.S. at 61 (legislative history cannot overcome plain meaning of statute); Grand Labs. v. Harris, 644 F.2d 729, 736 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982)
(legislative history unimportant if statute is plain on its face); United States v. Olmo, 642 F.2d 280,
281 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1087 (1981) (the plain language of a statute controls over
legislative history).
98. March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (plain meaning rule does
not preclude consideration of legislative history); Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413, 428 (3d Cir.
1974) (court applied the plain meaning rule but accepted legislative history to construe the plain and
unambiguous statute); Cabeli v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affid sub nom. Markham v.
Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (mere words contained in a statute do not always manifest or embody
the intent of enacting Congress). See generally H. FRmNDLY, BENcHmARKS 204 (1967) (Justice
Frankfurter's opinions on the use of the plain meaning rule to the exclusion of other statutory construction devices).
99. Compare Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (supporting use of the plain
meaning rule alone) with Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (supporting use
of all relevant information).
100. 242 U.S. 470, 471, 478-79 (1917).
101. Id. at 485.
102. 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
103. Id. at 479.
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In refusing to consider the 1980 House Agriculture Committee's Report, the Ruhe court held that subsequent legislative history does not
afford assistance in discerning the congressional intent embodied in earher statutes." 4 The court of appeals was consistent with its earlier decision in Moore v. Harris' in determining that subsequent legislative
history lacks probative value in statutory construction." 6 In Moore, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that legislative history, subsequent
to the passage of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,107 was
unpersuasive in discerning the intent of the enacting Congress.10 8 In
Moore, the court of appeals determined that the enacting Congress' intent is controlling with regard to questions of statutory construction.10 9
While most circuit courts find subsequent legislation useful in determining prior congressional intent, no circuit court places much probative
weight on subsequent legislative history. 110
In applying the reasonable basis test,"' the Ruhe court found that the
direct-payment income inclusion provision of the 1977 Act did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights." 2 The Ruhe court found that the
government's desire to exclude undeserving food stamp recipients from
the food stamp program by counting all spendable income as household
income for food stamp allocation purposes was a reasonable basis for the
income inclusion provisions of the 1977 Act." 3 However, the reasonable
basis used by the court of appeals, although correct in theory," 4 is not5
persuasive when considered in light of the factual situation in Ruhe.1
The court of appeals assumed that the plaintiffs would have allocated
104. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105.
105. 623 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
106. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-05; see infra text accompanying notes 107-09.
107. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
108. Moore, 623 F.2d at 921-22.
109. Idk
110. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969) (subsequent legislation
declaring the legislative intent deserves great weight in statutory construction); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (subsequent legislative history on the intent of a prior Congress may not be conclusive); Nevada Power Co.
v. Watt, 515 F. Supp. 307, 324 (D. Utah 1981), afid, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983) (by implication,
statutory construction in light of subsequent legislative history can conflict with the intent of the
enacting Congress). But see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of
Labor v. Clinchfleld Coal Co., 574 F.2d 1167, 1169 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (subsequent legislative history is useful to consider degree of protection afforded by statute).
111. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06; see supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
112. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.
113. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06.
114. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971) (if statutory goals are legitimate and
classification is rationally related to achievement of those goals, the statute has a reasonable basis).
In Ruhe, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the lack of governmental control over
the Arlington County subsidies could lead to misallocation of the housing funds to other areas.
Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106. See generally L. TlItm, supra note 73, at 991-95.
115. See infira text accompanying notes 118-19 & 121.
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their housing subsidies to other areas, including food expenditures, if the
1977 Act had not included direct-payment housing subsidies within the
household income accounting scheme. 116 Although the court of appeals
never expressly made this assumption, it is implicit within the court's
holding' 1 7 and is crucial to the court's finding of a reasonable basis behind the direct-payment income inclusion provision." 8 Relying upon the
assumption that the plaintiffs would have allocated their housing subsidies to other areas, the Ruhe court determined that the direct-payment
income inclusion provision of the 1977 Act created an incentive for recipient families to spend their direct-payment housing subsidies on rent
19
only.1

The Ruhe court's assumption that, if given the chance, the plaintiffs
would misallocate their housing subsidy funds, is questionable and fails
to consider that the high cost of rental housing in Arlington County was

a substantial incentive in persuading the plaintiffs to spend their housing

subsidies only on rent. 20 If the Ruhe court's assumption is incorrect, the

direct-payment income inclusion provision in the 1977 Act lacks a reasonable basis. 2 ' Therefore, the Ruhe court's holding that section 5(d)

does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Consti-

tution is premised upon a tenuous and suspect assumption.' 22 If the
Ruhe court's assumption is incorrect and the direct-payment provision
lacks a reasonable basis, the direct-payment income inclusion provision
116. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106. By determining that recipient control of the housing subsidies made
the direct-payment inclusion provisions of the USDA regulations reasonable, the court of appeals
implicitly suggested that, if the recipients had the opportunity to misappropriate the subsidies fraudulently, the recipients would do so. Id Evidence offered in Ruhe does not support this suggestion.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
117. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06.
118. Id at 105; see infra text accompanying note 121.
119. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106.
120. See Ruhe v. Block, 507 F. Supp. 1290, 1293-94 (E.D. Va. 1981), afld sub nor. Ruhe v.
Bergland, 683 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff Ruhe received $80.89 per month to assist in paying
her monthly rent of $241.00. Id. at 1293. Plaintiff Hembry received $95.73 per month to assist in
paying her monthly rent of $176.00. Id Plaintiff O'Brien received $88.93 per month to assist in
paying her monthly rent of $252.00. Id at 1294. All three plaintiffs lived alone. Id at 1293.
121. See supra notes 40, 69, 71 & 73. Under the Dandridgereasonable basis test, a statutory
classification is not violative of the equal protection clause if the classification fulfills a legitimate
governmental objective and is not arbitrary or capricious; see also Dandridge,397 U.S. at 485; Ruhe,
683 F.2d at 104-05. If the Ruhe court's assumption is incorrect, the direct-payment income inclusion provision fails to fulfill any governmental objectives because the plaintiffs would not need additional stimuli to force proper allocation of the subsidy payments to rent. Furthermore, if the Ruhe
court's assumption is incorrect, the direct-payment income inclusion provision discriminates arbitrarily between direct-payment recipients and vendor-payment recipients.
122. See Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 106. In Ruhe, the court of appeals suggested that the reasonable
basis underlying the direct-payment income inclusion provision stems from the food stamp recipient's control of cash in direct-payment subsidies and the lack of control in vendor-payment subsidies. Id Implicit within the Ruhe rational basis is the assumption that direct-payment recipients
will misallocate the subsidy funds if possible. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19 (explanation of the court of appeals' assumptions in Ruhe).
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of the 1977 Act violates the plaintiffs' equal protection rights.
IV.

123

CONCLUSION

In Ruhe, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly construed and
applied a statute of questionable constitutionality. 24 The treatment of
legislative history by the court of appeals was sound.1 2 s The court properly discerned the congressional intent behind the 1977 Food Stamp
Act.' 26 The Ruhe court correctly construed section 5(d) of the Act in
light of the 1977 Act's plain and unambiguous language.' 2 7 The Ruhe
court applied the plain meaning rule properly,' 28 and held that the legis29
lative history presented as evidence by the plaintiffs was irrelevant.
However, the court of appeals could have erred in finding that a reasonable basis 3 ' existed for the direct-payment income inclusion provision
and in subsequently determining that section 5(d) of the 1977 Act does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.' 3 '
After Ruhe, recipients of direct-payment housing subsidies and food
stamps
in the Fourth Circuit will receive diminished food stamp benefits.' 32 Good faith and proper allocation of all subsidy money toward
housing costs will not relieve direct-payment recipients from a reduction
in their food stamp benefits.' 3 3 Such recipients must weigh the aggregate
benefits of participation in both the direct-payment subsidy program and
the food stamp program. As a result of the Ruhe decision, the recipients
may be forced to participate in only one program. By implicitly forcing
some recipients of direct housing subsidies to choose between participation in either the housing subsidy or the food stamp program, the directpayment income inclusion scheme is inconsistent with the declared pol123. See supra note 120. Due to the high cost of rental housing in Arlington County, the plaintiffs were not likely to divert the housing subsidy money to other areas. Id The reasonable basis
behind the 1977 Act's direct-payment income inclusion provision does not exist in the context of the
Ruhe facts. See Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103.
124. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-06; see supra text accompanying notes 76, 79-80, 95-96, 104-06 (explaining the Ruhe court's use of the plain meaning rule).
125. See supra note 76 (support for Ruhe court's use of the plain meaning rule and treatment of
legislative history evidence); see supra text accompanying notes 76-82 (the Ruhe court's use of the
plain meaning rule).
126. See Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105; see also supra note 122.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92, 95-96.
128. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103-05; see supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
129. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 104-05; see supra text accompanying notes 60-63 & 78.
130. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06; see supra text accompanying notes 70-74, 112-13 (the Ruhe
court's application of reasonable basis test).
131. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 105-06; see supra text accompanying notes 114-16, 120-23 (criticism of
the Ruhe court's reasonable basis finding).
132. Ruhe, 683 F.2d at 103-06. But see 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1)(ii) (1984) (direct housing subsidy
payments paid to recipients of experimental housing subsidy programs in Green Bay, Wisconsin and
South Bend, Indiana do not count as household income for food stamp allocation purposes).
133. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1) (1984) (USDA regulation defining household income inclusion
plan). The USDA regulation is strict and contains no good faith exceptions. Id
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icy of the 1977 Act. 134 The Ruhe decision illustrates a problem in the
income accounting procedure of the 1977 Act. The problem in the accounting procedure encourages local governments administering directpayment subsidy programs to enact vendor-payment subsidy programs.1 35 If the Arlington County housing subsidy plan utilized a venas the plaintiffs in Ruhe, would
dor-payment mechanism, recipients, such
1 36
not suffer reduced food stamp benefits.

J. RANDALL MINCHEW*

134. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982). Congress declared that the 1977 Food Stamp Act's purpose is
to promote the general welfare and to safeguard the well-being of the nation's population by raising
levels of nutrition among low-income households. Id.
135. See 7 C.F.IL § 273.9(c)(1)(i) (1984). By enacting vendor-payment housing subsidy programs in place of direct-payment housing subsidy programs, local governments assist residents in
need of housing assistance without depriving residents of food stamp assistance. Id.
136. Id.
* Washington & Lee University (J.D. 1984); law clerk for Justice A. Christian Compton,
Supreme Court of Virginia.
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